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The Big Game: Metaphor and Education in the
Simpson Trial
Eileen A. Scallen *
The criminal trial of 0.1. Simpson has ended. The game is over. The
players have left the field. The commentators in the press and on the
local, national, and cable stations have all lined up to provide the postgame analysis. The only thing missing is the Goodyear blimp. The
master metaphor for this trial was "the big game," which is no surprise for
a couple of reasons. First, "trial as sport" is an old metaphor, arguably
reduced to a cliche-a metaphor used to the point such that it has lost its
vitality. Moreover, the "game" metaphor was inevitable for this trial,
given the football career of 0.1. Simpson.
But while the game metaphor is old, it has kept its power. And I am
concerned about its power over my students. The power of games is that
they generally have definite outcomes-one side wins and one side loses.
The power of the promise of a clear result is often ignored, although one
could see glimmers of it in the widespread fear that the Simpson case
would end in a hung jury, a tie. The uncertainty and unpredictability of
the outcome of the game creates tension and drama; who will win? In the
clarity of the outcome-whether the light of the victory or the darkness of
the loss-it becomes harder, however, to care about the perennial question:
Does it matter how you play the game?
As a law professor, I worry that my students have stopped caring
about this question. As illustrated by the Simpson case, and the articles in
this symposium, this question cannot be resolved by the rules of evidence,
the rules of professional responsibility or even the verdict itself. Maria L.
Ontiveros's article, Rosa Lopez, David Letterman, Christopher Darden,
and Me: Issues of Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in Evaluating Witness
Credibility, for example, argues that the images created through Christopher Darden's cross-examination of Rosa Lopez mattered a great deal.!

* The author is a Professor of Law at the University of California, Hastings College
of the Law.
1. See Maria L. Ontiveros, Rosa Lopez, David Letterman, Christopher Darden and Me:
Issues of Gender, Ethnicity and Class in Evaluating Witness Credibility, 6 HASTINGS
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His efforts to discredit her testimony by showing her inconsistencies in
providing her name, her addresses, and her estimates of the time frame of
the night of the murder were, in Professor Ontiveros's estimation, both
misleading in their disregard of cultural differences and hurtful, as Lopez
was held up to ridicule by the media. 2 Also, look at Thomas Morawetz's
article, Fantasy, Celebrity, and Homicide, concluding that the defense
strategy, of attempting to create a master narrative of police conspiracy,
was an attempt to engage the jury, and the larger public, in a fantasy
rather than a sense of the truth. 3
Christopher Darden and Johnnie Cochran's strategies were, however,
well within the bounds of the rules of evidence and the rules of professional conduct. Some would argue that they were only doing their jobs in the
most effective way possible. Professor Ontiveros would not argue that
Latina witnesses always tell the truth or that inconsistencies cannot be
significant in evaluating credibility. Professor Morawetz would not deny
that the police do sometimes commit perjury and plant or manipulate
evidence.
One way to answer the question of "does it matter how one plays the
game," is to shift the focus to the other players. It can be argued that 0.1.
Simpson and the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office pushed
their lawyers to make the arguments criticized by Ontiveros and Morawetz.
It can be argued that the defense lawyers failed to protect the integrity of
Rosa Lopez, that it was the defense's job to rehabilitate her credibility by
explaining the cultural differences more clearly and providing more context
for her testimony. It can be argued that the prosecution failed to prove
that the evidence in this particular case was solid, despite the racist
attitudes of one of its key police witnesses. It can be argued that Judge
Lance Ito, in his rulings on the relevancy of questions asked on crossexamination or on the evidence and arguments relating to racist conspiracies, failed to reign in the lawyers' excesses. It can be argued that the
media failed to present a controlled and fair picture of the case, distorting
witnesses like Rosa Lopez to the point of caricature. It can be argued that
the jurors failed to see through the "smoke" spewed forth by the lawyers
on both sides.
These arguments appear to absolve two players, Darden and Cochran,
from any responsibility for their rhetorical strategies. But Christopher
Darden is not naive; we cannot realistically expect that an experienced
prosecutor in Los Angeles, with its heavy Latin-American population, is

L.J. 135 (1995).
2. [d. at 139-44.
3. See Thomas Morawetz, Fantasy, Celebrity and Homicide, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S
L.J. 209 (1995).
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ignorant of at least some of the problems Professor Ontiveros points out.
At a minimum, Darden knew he had a choice in conveying his attitude
toward Lopez. Similarly, Johnnie Cochran is certainly aware of the power
of "the race card" and how it can be held or played, as a part of any hand
in a criminal case against a black defendant in Los Angeles. There is
evidence that the defense team itself was conflicted as to whether it was
necessary to make the racist attitudes and actions of police officers in other
cases a central issue in the Simpson case. 4 Moreover, even if these
lawyers were not aware of these problems, it can be argued that they
should have been.
Courtroom strategies must be decided without the lUXUry of certainty.
An advocate must balance a multitude of variables in deciding how to
frame a case in general, and in deciding what specific questions to ask
during direct or cross-examination. The temptation to appeal to the
prejudice or bias of the jury-to fear and ignorance-in the belief that it
will help your outcome, can be overwhelming. What incentive is there to
resist? Indeed, a lawyer has every incentive not to resist. The lawyer can
always blame the client, blame the other side for not objecting, blame the
judge for failing to rule correctly, blame the jury for its lack of critical
thinking skills, or blame the media for mischaracterizing what you said.
You can blame everyone but yourself.
Some of my students try to answer the question concerning how one
plays the game by invoking the duty of zealous representation that they
believe lawyers owe to their clients. In doing so, they shift the blame to
"the system." There is no duty of zealous representation, however, in the
A.B.A. Model Rules. There is no such duty in the California Code of
Professional Conduct. Despite this, those same students persist in
believing that there is such a duty, and that the duty permits them to
engage in any conduct that does not violate the other rules of professional
responsibility. They believe this gives them a relatively clear path to the
goal line.
I think, however, that there can be consequences for ignoring the
question of how you ought to play the game-practical, personal and
professional consequences. The chief practical problem is backfire; will
the jury feel you are pandering to their lowest instincts and react against
your client? A related practical problem regards impact on future clients;
how long will a defense based primarily on fear of racism work? It may
help a client today, but what about the client tomorrow? What happens to
the future client who has been more clearly and directly set up by racist
police officers than the client you defend today? Will that future jury

4. Eric MaInic, The Simpson Verdicts: Shapiro Trades Criticism with Cochran and
Bailey, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at A3.
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really focus on your client's case or will they dismiss your arguments as
"the same old song?"
There can also be personal consequences that flow from the arguments
a lawyer makes. If a lawyer is willing to argue anything on behalf of her
or his client, does that lawyer risk losing any sense of what she or he
actually believes? Can a lawyer really be successful in believing that her
or his personal beliefs are irrelevant to the client's case? Will a lawyer's
ability to dissociate her or himself from her or his client and the case lead
to a pervasive cynicism that makes it difficult to find the value in other
causes?
Finally, lawyer's arguments can have consequences for the legal
profession, with reverberations in society as a whole. Will the view of the
lawyer as mouthpiece, willing to champion any cause, case or argument
for a price, finally erase any view of the lawyer as a civic leader?
I tend to view the question of how the game is to be played rather
personally because I teach evidence, civil procedure, and seminars in
argumentation and persuasion. I teach the game; I teach how to play it
effectively. I believe, however, that I must motivate students to play the
game well. I worry about the consequences of students looking only to the
. outcome of the game, and ignoring how it is played. But how do I best
teach my students?
Legal education is classically and notoriously based on the Socratic
dialogue, the teacher asking questions and the student responding. In the
Socratic dialogue-in both Plato's version and legal education-the
questions are rhetorical and the answers are scripted. The teacher's job is
to ask the questions and maneuver the students to the answer, without
revealing, of course, that the student has "reached" the answer. I use this
method, along with others, in teaching my courses. I can defend it most
of the time because I think it forces the student to listen and analyze
problems actively, rather than passively absorbing lecture material. But
I cannot teach about the issues I am raising here-issues of how the game
should be played-in the same Socratic way.
The hard questions raised here are ultimately lessons about character,
the character of the player. As Professor James Boyd White has noted,
this is a question of "ethics" (which in Greek means "habit" or "character") in a literal sense, a question of what "kind of character a person
defines for himself and offers to others-the kind of life and community
he makes-when he chooses to think and talk in one way rather than in
another. "5 In his article, Professor White creates his own Socratic

5. James Boyd White, The Ethics of Argument: Plato's Gorgias and the Modern
Lawyer, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 849 (1983).
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dialogue to confront these issues from the perspective of the modern
lawyer.
I have my seminar students read Professor White's article, which, like
Plato's dialogue, does lead its readers to certain conclusions. Moreover,
I have some of my own answers regarding how the game ought to be
played. The problem is that I do not believe it does my students much
good to have me write articles about these ideas or to teach them, whether
through the Socratic dialogue, lecture, or any other method, about these
answers. You cannot "make" someone else's character for them.
I have had many students who really believed that the only thing that
mattered about the game was whether you won or lost. I have had a few
of these former students come to me after they lost "a game," wanting to
engage me in conversation about how the game was played-not about why
they lost, but rather about what it did to them. These conversations have
been painful for each of us. I struggle not to say, "I knew that" or "I
could have told you that." My former students struggle not to place the
"blame" somewhere else. I would like to say that each person left each
of these conversations unburdened and enlightened, but that would not be
true. There was generally only a sense of sadness because it appears that
another choice would have been a better one, a realization made through
the rueful certainty of hindsight. There is no firm sense, however, that
these students will make a better choice next time, for "next time" will
present its own set of complexities.
So what do I do as a teacher of the game? I have chosen a very
limited goal: to teach law students that they have choices to make-in
deciding how to question a witness, what to argue in closing arguments,
how to frame the case, and in every other context within which a lawyer
operates. One of the values of the Simpson case is that it allowed my
students to look at the attorneys involved, think about the choices they had
to make, and ask themselves individually: "Is that the kind of lawyer I
want to be?" I want my students to think about the consequences of their
choices before they must make them in moments of pressure and
uncertainty. I want each student to see that in choosing how to communicate as a lawyer, a person makes her character and contributes to the
character of the profession. And that is the name of the game.

